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The Sacred and the Secular: Separation of Church (Mosque) and State & Implications for Women's Rights

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Abstract

This study is a cross-national, longitudinal exploration of the relationships between religion, state, and three key dimensions of women's rights – economic, social, and political – on a sample of 158 countries from 1981 to 2005 controlling for alternative explanations of women's rights. A five point ordinal indicator of the level of institutional secularism is developed to evaluate these relationships. The components of this indicator are also disaggregated to determine their individual effects on each category of women's rights. This is important since core theories are lacking on how the various components of religion affect women's rights together or in isolation. A key finding is that secular institutional arrangements promoteallthree types of women'srights while religious in cursionsin the political sphereareduce protection of theserights. Furthermore, countries with Islamic legal systems and those with predominant religions tend to discriminate against women in the enjoyment of their rights. Taken together, the findings reveal that limiting the influence of religion in politics seems to be the key to the expansion of women's rights in most societies.

Keywords: institutional secularization; separation of state and religion; Islam; women's rights

I. Introduction

Religion plays an increasingly prominent role on the global political stage and in the political life of countries worldwide, but empirical research into its human rights effectshas been limited.

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This article seeks to address this deficiency through a comparative and global analysis of the relationship between religion, the state, and three key dimensions of women's rights – economic, social, and political –on a sampleof158countries(1981to 2005) controlling for alternative explanations of these rights. Women's rights and gender equality are perhaps the most contentious religious, political, and ideological issues of the 21st century. Yet, surprisingly little scholarship focuses onhow institutional relationships between religion and state shape women's rightswhen the nature of these rights are clearly connected to church-state relations and cultural and national identity.To date, the extant literature focuses on the dominant religious heritage, particularly Islam, which is widely viewed as one of the most powerful barriers to gender equality (Afary 2004; Afkhami 1999; Mayer 1999; Angrist March 2012; Fish October 2002).[2]This approach is not helpful in advancing theoretical understandings of the causal nexus between religion and women's rights, and also treats Islam as unique among other world religions in its treatment of women when scholars have documented how both the philosophy and practice of most world religions grew out of, and largely maintain patriarchal structuresthat codify the subjugation of womentomen (Howland 1999; Maguire 2003).

The core argument of this paper is that it is not the type of religion *per se* that influences women's rightsattainment but the extent to which religion and state, or sacred and secular, are separated or fused (i.e., the level of a country's institutional secularization) with countries that experience religious incursions in the political sphere most likely to reduce government protections of women's rights.As Kaplan claims, the barriers to gender equality are often drawn from the religious inclination of the state. She states, "…*any* religion, as long as it has a stronghold on the state and can wield real power, will be a great stumbling block for substantial change in secular matters" that benefit women (1992: 55). The combination of authoritarianism and fusion of state and religion, referred to here as the "double whammy," is expected to produce particularly bad outcomes for women with their rights attainment lowest in non-secular authoritarian regimes.

[2]The majority of this scholarship classifies Muslim countries using a dichotomous measure of predominant religion. Predominant religionis defined in this study as that religion the majority of a country's population identifies with.

This paper proceeds as follows: the firstsection presents theoretical arguments that link institutional secularization to greater respect for women's rightsand entanglement of religion and state or institutionalized religion to declines in these rights. Testable hypotheses are derived for the empirical section of this paper. Importantly, this study expands the focus of research to all major world religions to contribute to the development of a broader theory on the relationships between gender, religion, and the state. Scholars advocate for the importance of such an approach (Inglehart and Norris 2003). Next is an examination of alternative the oretical explanation sidentified in the international relations literature for why states respect or violate women's rights followed by a discussion of measures and empirical models and tests. The study concludes with an overview of key findings.

1.1 The oretical Arguments on Institutional Secularism and Women's Rights Attainment:

There are good conceptual and theoretical reasons to suspect an institutionally secular state is most apt to advance and enforce women's rights. For one, institutional and legal barriers associated with a secular state, such as separation of state and political party and disestablishment of religion, are designed tominimize religious incursions in the political sphere and, thereby, limit the ability of religious and political authorities to legislate on women's rights and to legitimizerestrictions on the exercise of their rights (Amor 2009). Conversely, a society where religious entities exert substantial controloverthelevers ofstatepolicymakingare subject to more pressures or opportunities than secular states for the close involvement of religion in the political sphere. Htun and Weldon (2011) find that political authorities in countries with Islamic law are less incentivized to enforce the full range of women's rights, especially their nationality and social rights (i.e., the rights to equal inheritance, to equitable divorce, to confer citizenship to children or husband), because these rights directly challenge codified religious traditions and regulations that reinforce female subordination. Religious authorities view granting equal rights to women, particularly in marriage and divorce, as destructive to familyunity and the institution of marriage. Not surprisingly, many governments have great difficulty advancing women's rights in places where religious strictures are justified as divine truth and observed by society as sacred and immutable religious norms.

According to Burn (2013: 92), while religious cultures and ideologies can be supportive of gender equality, it is highly unlikely that institutionalized confessional states can produce the same commitment in law and practice to gender equality as institutionally secular states, especially those that place a high premium on political freedoms and civil liberties. He argues that the latter best promote gender equality because they allow for more diverse openings or spaces for social activism and change, which, in turn, may encourage the cultivation of religious values supportive of gender equality (and of gender inequality as well), the flourishing of countercultural social values and movements, and the growth of both religious and secular subcultures that challenge dominant religious and social hierarchies. This environment creates fertile ground for a culture of gender equality to prevail where "a climate where de jure legal rights are more likely to be translated into de facto rights in practice" and where women can freely exercise their rights(Inglehart and Norris 2003).

Importantly, challenges to dominant religious or cultural hierarchies are highly unlikely in institutionalized confessional states where coercive control exercised by religious authorities over politics and society undermines the ability of governments to support diverse and conflicting interpretations of the dominant faith. In fact, United Nations researchfinds that entanglement between church (or mosque) and state leads to the institutionalization of patriarchal values and traditions in ways that oppress women and limit their rights and opportunities. Assertions of the oppressive potential of institutionalized religion are supported by Steven Kettell's (2013) comparative analysis of state religion and political freedom. Kettell finds countries that institutionalize religion, irrespective of dominant religious faith, are most apt to infringe upon individual rights and political freedoms. In particular, he (2013) postulates that institutional favoritism (i.e., officially recognizing one religion as the state religion)involves basing state authority and key aspects of national identity and citizenship on divisive and sectarian grounds. This, in turn, fosters discrimination, repression, and intolerance of citizens' rights and freedoms, particularly those not adhering to the state religion.

Indeed, countries with an established state religion are found to experience significantly lower levels of political freedoms and civic equality (i.e. in terms of political rights, civil liberties, and freedom from religious persecution) than those without a state religion, as well as a significantly higher degree of government and social regulation of religion.[3]

These findings are consequentialfor the state of women's rights worldwide because, in the absence of basic political freedoms and rights, such as freedom of speech and movement (to organize and protest, for example), it is exceedingly difficult for women to pursue educational, employment, and political opportunities to advance their rights. Lower levels of civic equality experienced by countries with a state religion are especially problematic for women who experience the most pervasive civic inequalities and depreciated familial and nationality rights worldwide (Seager 2009). Related to this point, stateswith an established religion often target religious restrictions at familial and gender relations, sexuality, and reproduction. For example, in fused autocratic states like Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emiratessmall details of social life, such as women's freedom of movement, dress, and reproductive autonomy are subject to strict regulation by religious and political authorities, placing citizens in a more dependent and oppressed relationship with state authority (Price 1999). Another example is Latin America, the most Catholic continent in the world, where Catholic strictures play a central role in legitimizing the subordinate status of women. In ultra conservativeChile women's familial rights are subject to frequent assault by conservative religious forces, and abortionisillegalunderallcircumstances (Guzman et al. 2010; Seager 2009).

It is reasonable to conclude from the foregoing discussionthat an institutionally secular state where religion is marginal to the political order and where religious groups are prevented from subjecting an entire society to a single dominant cultural hierarchy is most apt to advance women's rights. Furthermore, history reveals a greater cultivation of values supportive of gender equality in secular states, such as the United States and Turkey. Controlling for levels of democracy and economic development, systematic indicators reveal that, on average, these states have provided women more economic and educational opportunities and effective legal rights than any "alternative yet experienced on a multinational scale (Burn 2013: 97)."

[3] The author uses the 2011 Freedom House index as his measures of political rights and civil liberties, which he cross-referenced with two indices of countries with a state religion.

II. Core Hypotheses:

Ourdiscussionregardingtheinfluenceofreligionongovernmentpractices towards women leadsto thefollowing testable hypothesis.

Hypothesis1: The higher the level of institutional secularization in a given country, the greater the realizationof women'seconomic, social, and politicalrights, ceteris paribus (+).

This study contributes to the development of a broader theory of the relationships between gender, religion, and the state through an expansion of the focus of research to all world religions, not just Islam, to determine whether they share important commonalities in their treatment of women that make them amenableto cross-national comparison. According to many commentators, though religious practices and traditions vary considerably across and within countries and over time, certain gender discriminatory religious strictures or tenets embedded in religion suggest women should be subordinated to men in the household and in the public realm (Bayes and Tohidi 2001; Casanova April 2009). The most influential stricture is the "complementarity" doctrine, where in historical text and practice, women are oftentimes viewed as complementary to men, but not equal (Htun 2003; Maguire 2003). This religious strictureamong others (i.e., obedience and modesty rules that reinforce male control of women) is often used by authorities to legitimize widespread gender inequality and the subordination of women to men on the grounds that God made men and women biologically different, and that these differences mandate a separate and subordinate role for women with their identity limited to the domestic realm (Tohidi and Bayes 2001:18). This reaffirms the importance of an institutionally secular state to the advancement of women's rights.

It is important to note that attempts to conduct a broad cross-national analysis of religion across disparate cultures are not unproblematic since grouping all societies together using a single secularism indicator invariably obscures important differences between and within countrieswith majority Muslim, Hindu, Catholic, Buddhist, or other religious heritages. This paper uses a measure of predominant religion to address this concern and to control for the varying impacts of different religious faiths on women's rights. Such a measure shouldhelp determine whether institutional secularization is a significant determinant of women's rights controlling for religious heritage.

Importantly, I hypothesize that religion will have its most perniciousinfluence on women's social rights becausetheserightsoftenfallunderthejurisdictionoflocal communities andreligious leaders, are more diffuseinnature, target a wider array of activities and rules, pertain to and overlap with issues surrounding family and sexuality and reproduction, andareoftenculturally dictated. The nature of these rights alsointimately connects them to church-state relations and cultural and national identity.

Hypothesis2: The realization of women's economic, social, and political rights is lowest in fused or religious states, with the expectation that religion will exert its most negative influence on social rights, ceteris paribus (-).

Our study alsoexaminestheinfluenceofIslamic(Sharia)legalsystemsonwomen's rights.Significant scholarship finds thatthe patriarchal conception of equality expressed in Islamic (Sharia) law is a major barrier to the advancement of women's rights.[4]Islamist feminist Fatima Mernissi (1975) claims that Islam's distinct system of divinely ordained rights and duties that prescribes different and unequal treatment of women to men, andthat prioritizes communal or group rights over individual rights is incompatible with western notions of rights that emphasize the absolute equality of the sexes (as the term has come to be understood in modern day usage). Assertions regarding the incompatibility of Islamic values and women's rights are supported by comparative attitudinal studies that find Muslim populations are the least receptive of all religious faiths to gender equality and sexual liberalization and possess the most discriminatory attitudes. Furthermore, these views do not change much over time or inter-generationally (Inglehart and Norris 2003; Fish 2002). Sarkissian (2012: 507) finds empirical evidence that Muslim states also possess significantly higher levels of government regulation of religion, state, and society than other religious faiths, including regulations aimed at restricting the freedoms and opportunities of women. These include an extensive array of discriminatory religious codes, personal status laws, and other legal barriers that are deeply woven into the social fabric of many Islamic societies.

[4]See, for example, Fish 2002; Inglehart and Norris 2003; Htun and Weldon Winter 2010; and Mayer 1995, 2007.

However, Islamist feminists are quick to point out that most world religions and cultures, not just Islam, are the foundation of patriarchal norms that underwrite the subordination of women.Buddhism, Catholicism, and Hinduism, in particular, prioritize community duties over individual rights where women are often embedded within social structures that favor group or collective rights and needs.[5]Muslim countries also differsubstantially inthedegreetowhichtheyinstitutionalizereligion making it more accurate to talk about varieties of Islam – some secular and progressive (e.g., Turkey), some moderate (e.g., Tunisia), and some orthodox (e.g., Saudi Arabia) (Shah November 2006). Islamist feminists claim these significant variations within and between Islamic states reveal Islam is not impervious to change and, in fact, is amenable to significant reform (Barlow and Akbarzadeh 2006). However, Cherif (October 2010: 1152) finds that "Despite differences in the degree to which they institutionalize religion, Muslim countries behave similarly with respect to women's rights in inheritance and nationality laws." Most Muslim countries also behave similarly in the types of restrictions they place on women's public roles (Crotty 1997; Mayer 2007). Hence, we expect countries that elevateIslamicprinciplesin law to violatewomen'srights.

The specificeffects ofIslamiclaw are operationalized using a dummyvariablecoded from legal systems datafrom the CentralIntelligence Agency (CIA) *World Factbook* website. Countriesare coded asa"1"ifthe CIA World Factbook specifiesSharialawispartofthestate'slegalsystem. Weoffer the followinghypothesis:

Hypothesis3: Islamic legal systems possess unique conceptions of women's rights that are antithetical to their economic, political,andsocialrights attainment,withthe expectationthatIslam exerts the most negativeinfluenceon socialrights, ceteris paribus(-).

As previously stated, we control for predominant religion and hypothesize that world religions exert a statistically significant negative influence on women's rights with the exception of Protestantism which should exert a positive influence on these rights. Studies demonstrate Protestantism propagates more liberal views of women's roles outside the home than other religious denominations (Inglehart and Norris 2003).

[5] Another example is the pervasive discrimination and inequality women experience in African societies where patriarchal cultural traditions and discriminatory customary law of tribal society clash with their rights.

III. Alternative Explanations Of Government Practices Toward Women

Our models include alternative explanationsof government practices toward women's rights. The first variable - theinternationalization of human rightsnorms – is a measure of the growingglobalacceptanceof women's rightsin principle and in practice. It is used in this study to determine whether international norms are strong enough to challenge cultural and religious barriers to gender equality. This variableis a weightedratificationscale of thelevelof official endorsement by nation-states of the Convention on the Eliminationof AllFormsof Discriminationagainst Women (CEDAW).[6] The level of official endorsement is measured by the number and severity of reservations registered by state signatories to the articles of CEDAW. Countries that lodge the fewest significant reservations are expected tomodify domestic laws and practices to conform to the articles of the Convention, whereas countries that register reservations that significantly undermine the scope of the Convention are less incentivized to align their domestic laws with the Convention's principles.

Next, democratic regimes are found to accord greater respect to women's rights in comparison to authoritarian regimes.[7]Democratic or democratizing states guarantee a range of individual rights and freedoms that promotebroad types of civic activism that are often driving forces for social change beneficial to women's rights. This paper also controls for the presence of armed conflict or the level of formalized violence. Women's rights should suffer in conflict situations through direct victimization which exposes womentotherisk ofvarious forms of violenceand reinforces patriarchaltraditions andpractices(Angrist March2012; True 2012). Next, colonial heritage is an important determinant of women's rights but it remains an open empirical question whether it is a positive or negative force for women's rights. Though colonizers brought democracy, the rule of law and trade relationships to their colonies, feminist scholars assert colonialism led to declines in women's rights because colonial rulestrengthenedindigenous male control over women, and reduced their access to vital material resources (Waylen 1996).

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[6] CEDAW calls upon its nearly 190 member countries to eliminate cultural, religious, and traditional barriers and practices that violate women's human rights. *Source:* http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/reservations.htm.

[7]Refer to Appendix C for a discussion of the coding of alternative explanations.

An extensive scholarship finds that the level of economic development is associated with significant improvements in women's rights.[8] Purportedly, the structural requisites of the modernization process, suchas mass education and urbanization, break the oppressive weight of traditional patriarchal practices, afford women more educational and labor opportunities, andempower them throughnew social roles. Furthermore, developed countries have more resources to meetwomen's subsistence, education,andreproductive healthneeds. To draw firm conclusions about the potential causal impacts of alternative explanations, a variable that measures time is included to eliminate any explanation that might be linked to natural improvements or declines over time in the level of women's rights. Lastly, this study controls for population size since large populations tend to strain national resources and the ability of governments to meet socioeconomic needs (Henderson June 1993).

IV. Researh Design:Variablesand Methods

This study employs a pooledcross-sectional, time-series designusing orderedlog it with robust standarderrors on a representative globalsample of 158 countries for the time period 1981to 2005. The country sample includes nations of the world having a population of at least 500,000 in 1981. Robust standard errorsare reported to address the thre at of he teroskedasticity, and the dependent variable—women'seconomic, political, and socialrights— is lagged by oneyear, because it is reasonable to assume that the current year's level of women's rights depends upon the previous year's level of women'srights. Referto Appendix Afor a summary of descriptive statistics for all variables, AppendixB forthe country sample,andAppendixCforalistofindependent and control variables andasummaryof their measurement.

[8] See Apodaca 1996, 1998;WorldBank2001;Boserup1970; Poe etal.1997; and Forsythe et al. 2000.

1. Operationalizationof Variables

Dependent variables-Women's Economic,Social,andPolitical Rights

This study uses the women's rights variables from the Cingranelli-Richards (CIRI) human rights dataset, which are aggregate four-pointstandards-basedordinal measures that range from zero to three with zero representing minimal evidence of the rights in question with three representing the maximum standard.[9] The CIRI dataset operationalizes (a) whether laws guarantee women an array of important internationally recognized economic, social, and political rights and (b) the level of their enforcement.

The women's political rights variable includes several internationally recognized rights including the rights to vote, to run for political office, to hold elected and appointed government positions, to join political parties, and to petition government officials. Women's economic rights include several internationally recognized rights including the rights to equal pay for equal work; to gainful employment without the need too tainahusbandor male relative's consent; equalityin hiring and promotion practices; Theright to be free from sexual har as smentin the workplace; the right to work at night; The right to non-discrimination by employers and to workin occupations classified as dangerous; The right to work in the military and police force; And the right to job security (i.e.,maternity leave, unemployment benefits, noarbitraryfiringorlay offs). Lastly, women's social rights reflect the most private as pect sof individual, familial, and community life. These include the rights to equal in heritance; To enter in to marriage onabas is of equality with men; To travel a broad; toobtaina passport; Toconfercitizenship to children or husband;toinitiate a divorce; toown, acquire, manage, and retain property broughtintomarriage; toparticipateinsocial, cultural, andcommunity activities; toaneducation; The freedomtochoose aresidence/domicile; freedomfrom non-consensual femalegenital mutilation (FGM); and freedom from forcedsterilization.[10]

[9]Specific information on the construction of the CIRI women's rights variables is found at http://www.humanrightsdata.org/. Other data sets such as the UNDP's Gender Inequality Index were considered but CIRI is the only dataset that fully covers the years of this study.

[10]Thevariableforwomen'ssocialrightsextendsonly to2005becauseCingranelliandRichards (CIRI)Data Setretired this variable as of 2005.

1.1 Independent Variables

Level of Institutional Secularism (i.e., separation of church and state)

This study introduces three measures that are generally indicative of the level of institutional secularization (i.e., the degree off or maland actual separation of state and religion) inagivencountry including variablesfor:(1)officialstate religion, (2) the politicization of religious interests, and (3) freedom of religion. These measures are selected since they distinguish more or less between secular countries and the data for these measures are widely available for most countries, whereas data for more specific or nuanced measures, such as the presence of religious courts or government financial favoritism toward one religion, are not available for several of the countries that comprise our dataset. Furthermore, these measures may not travel well across nations since they may be too specific to a particular religious heritage such as the presence of religious courts in Muslim societies.

Official/EstablishedStateReligion: The first component documents the structural relationship between religion and state base donw he the ra country maintainsa legal separation between the two spheres or officially establishes a particular religion. Countries with an official state religion tend toaccord the state religion a preferential status and more substantial influence over government policy by delegating elements of the judicial system to the official religion, incorporating religious law into state law, and providing mandatory financial support to the establis hedreligion. Kettell (2013) finds the preferential status accorded to state religion also contributes to lower levels of political freedoms. This variableis codedas:"0" if the state hasone official/established religionor the state does not officially endorse a particular religion but one religion serve sun officially as the state religion;"1"ifthe state has multipleofficial/establishedreligions;and"2" ifthe state hasnoofficial/established religion. Countries with no established religion receive the highest score because they tendnot to accord special treatment to a particular religion(s).

Theprimarysourcesofthismeasurearethe*CIA WorldFactbook*,andtheU.*S.State* Department's Annual Report on Religious Freedom**.**

ThePoliticization of Religion:The second component is a dichotomous measurethat capturesreligious incursions in the political realm through "officeholding." Specifically, it examines whether the chief executive orlargest government party represents national religious interests, including that of Islam, Catholicism, Hinduism, Judaism, Buddhism, or Christianity. It is reasonable to assume that a chief executive and/or political parties representing national religious interests will actually use their influence to advocate on behalf of those interests which, as previously discussed, often clash with women's rights. As Minkenberg (2002:239) notes, "The most direct link between religion and politics attheinter section of thee lectoral and policy-making level sexists where explicitly religious parties…play arole in the party system." Underthismeasure, acountry receives as core of "0" if the chief executive or largest government party represents national religiousinterests, which includes one or more of theaboveworldreligions. The country receives a score of"1" if the chief executive or largest government party does not represent national religious interests. The source of this measureis the World Bank's *Database of Political Institutions* (DPI).

Freedom of Religion: The third component is adichotomous mea sure that taps the Extent tow hichcitizensare free to exercise and practice their religious beliefs and the degree to which the state involves itself in regulating or legislating religion through restrictions on religious practices. The measure is at hree point ordinal indicat or that is codedas follows: ascore of "0" indicates that government restriction sonreligious practicesare severe and widespread;a scoreof "1"indicates such practices aremoderate, and ascoreof"2"indicates suchpractices arepracticallyabsent. The primary source of this measure is the *CIRID ataset.* Refer to http://www.humanrightsdata.org for more information on variable coding.

The three components of our measure–official/establishedstate religion, free domofreligion, andpoliticization ofreligiousinterests –are disaggregated and also total edinto an ordinal indicat or that ranges fromal owof0 (i.e., countries that are not institutionallyse cular on these measures)to a highof 5(i.e.,countriesthat generally maintainaseparationof stateand religion).

1.12 The Models

We employ five statistical model sinourdataset. The first modelin Table1 includesthe institutional secularismindicator (only) while the second model in this table introduces the Islamic law variable to determine whe the the results for institutionalsecularismremainrobust withtheinclusionofthis variable. IfIslamic lawreallyis the main culprit intheoppressionofwomen,asmany scholarsclaim,the institutional secularism variable should lose statistical significance. The third model in Table2 introduces a dichotomous measure of predominant religion for the world religions: Catholicism, Islam, Buddhism, Hinduism, Protestantism, and Orthodox. The fourth model in Table 3 inverts the values of the five point institutional secularism scale, which ranges fromal owof 0 (i.e., the most secular) to a high of 5 (i.e., the most religious), to capture the aggregated effects of institutionalized religion on women's rights. Weterm this measure "institutional religiosity." The fifth model in Table 4 disaggregates our five point secularism indicator to test for specific effects of the variables that comprise our indicator - religious freedom, official state religion, and politicization of religion - since most studies have not developed core theories on how the various components of religion affect women's rights together or in isolation.

V. Resultsand Discussion

Table 1 provides the results for the orderedlogitmodelsforwomen's political, economic, and socialrightson the global sample of countries from 1981to2005. Logitc oefficients are reported with robust standard errors in parentheses. The asterisks next to the coefficients indicate the level of statistical significance. The model sin Tables1 through 4 explain from 42 percent to 60 percent of the cases, which is are as onably goodfit. Not surprisingly, the most significant predictor of women's economic, social, and political rights is the levelof women's rights from the previous year. The firstmodelinTable 1below includesthe institutionalsecularism indicator(only)while the secondmodelinthistable introducestheIslamic law variableto determinewhether theresults for institutional secularismremain robust with its inclusion.

The logit results from Table 1 reveal that institutional secularism is a statistically significant predictor across all categories of women's rights with the results for social and political rights in the hypothesized direction at better than the .01 level of statistical significance, and at the .05 to .10 levels for women's economic rights.

This relationship holds even controlling for the effects of Islamic law. In fact, the findings show that the Islamic law variable is not a significant determinant of women's economic and political rights even at the .10 level of statistical significance. However, as hypothesized, Islamic law exerts a statistically significant negative influence on women's social rights. Overall, these findings confirm the core hypothesis of this study that institutional secularism is a more important determinant of cross-national variations in women's rights than is the religious character of the legal system. See Table 1 on the next page.

TABLE1.Women'sRightsontheGlobalSample, Aggregated Model (1981 – 2005)

Independent Variables	**Model 1**	**Model 2**	**Model 1**	**Model 2**	**Model 1**	**Model 2**
	Political Rights (PR)	**Political Rights**	**Economic Rights (ER)**	**Economic Rights**	**Social Rights (SR)**	**Social Rights**
Institutional Secularism	**.090*** **	**.081*** **	**.075** **	**.069***	**.111*** **	**.110*** **
	(0.30)	(.032)	(0.37)	(0.42)	(0.31)	(.031)
Islamic(Sharia)Law	----	-0.66	---	-.036	---	**-.40** **
		(.165)		(.142)		(.16)
CEDAWCommitment	**.120*** **	**.120*** **	**.052*** **	**.051*** **	**.071*** **	**.062*** **
	(0.21)	(0.20)	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.18)	(0.18)
Democracy	**.082*** **	**.057*** **	**.075*** **	**.076*** **	**.081*** **	**.082*** **
	(.017)	(.018)	(.026)	(.026)	(.016)	(.016)
LogofGDP Per Capita	.069	.068	**.379*** **	**.361*** **	**.181*** **	**.179*** **
	(.045)	(.045)	(.043)	(.047)	(.049)	(.049)
International Conflict	.114	.099	-.117	-.115	.17	**.19***
	(.105)	(.10)	(.099)	(.099)	(.11)	(0.10)
Civil Conflict	-.052	-.054	-.015	-.014	**-.102***	**-.101** **
	(.077)	(.076)	(.053)	(.054)	(.057)	(.054)
Log of Population	-.054	-.019	**-.198*** **	**-.183*** **	-.098	-.116
	(.086)	(.086)	(.075)	(.075)	(.094)	(.089)
BritishInfluence	**-.621*** **	**-.53*** **	**-.47*** **	**-.47*** **	**-.60*** **	**-.529*** **
	(.15)	(.15)	(.13)	(.14)	(.14)	(.154)
SpanishInfluence	-.19	-.19	**-.52*** **	**-.51*** **	**-.50*** **	**-.46*** **

	(.17)	(.18)	(.14)	(.14)	(.16)	(.16)
FrenchInfluence	-.28	-.20	-.044	-.028	-.175	-.18
	(.18)	(.18)	(.166)	(.171)	(.189)	(.19)
PortugueseInfluence	-.091	-.078	-.33	-.317	-.37	-.22
	(.32)	(.307)	(.25)	(.250)	(.29)	(.29)
***Political Rights = PR; Economic Rights = ER; Social Rights = SR**						
Independent Variables	**Model 1**	**Model 2**	**Model 1**	**Model 2**	**Model 1**	**Model 2**
Variables	**PR Rights**	**PR**	**ER Rights**	**ER R Rights**	**SR R Rights**	**SR Rights**
Ottoman	-1.03***	-.942***	-1.04***	-1.04***	-.56*	-.42
	(.368)	(.376)	(.282)	(.284)	(.030)	(.35)
Time	**.068*** **	**.074*** **	.001	-.001	-.009	-.008
	(.025)	(.026)	(.017)	(.017)	(.011)	(.011)
Nairobi	**.64***	**.73*******	**.39*** **	**.42*** **	-.082	-.39
	(.36)	(.15)	(.15)	(.15)	(.162)	(.28)
Beijing	.102	.001	-.008	-.022	-.146	-.19
	(.75)	(.276)	(.181)	(.181)	(.203)	(.20)
Beijing2	.042	.038	.082	.078	**-.31****	**-.286***
	(.199)	(.195)	(.131)	(.13)	(.14)	(.139)
UNLogYears	.44	.13	**.043***	**.039*** **	.20	.11
	(.31)	(.13)	(.023)	(.21)	(.29)	(.29)
Women's Rights (t-1)	**4.31*** **	**4.32*** **	**2.82*** **	**2.82*** **	**3.83*** **	**3.83*** **
	(.153)	(.154)	(.112)	(.112)	(.101)	(.101)
R 2	0.60	0.60	0.43	0.42	0.58	0.58
WaldChi2	1015.80	1019.72	1257.14	1312.24	1720.67	1715.72
N	2975	2975	2910	2900	2785	2785

P<*.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01

As hypothesized, in Table 2 on the next page, the statistically significant positive influence of institutional secularism on women's rights holds controlling for predominant religion. Though predominant religion generally exerts a statistically significant negative influence on women's rights, this measure does not appear to attenuate the relationship between all three types of women's rights and institutional secularism. This result is probably due to the strong neutralizing effects of secularism on religion which again reaffirms the importance of an institutionally secular state to the advancement of women's rights. The insignificant findings for Catholicism are intriguing since Catholic teachings propagate traditional roles for women including restrictions on their public presence (i.e., lower rates of political representation and labour market participation) (Reynolds 1999; Kentworthy and Malami 1999; Guzman et al. 2010; Amuchastegui et al. 2010). These mixed findings give root to many specific questions well-suited to small-N case studies. As expected, Protestantismis positively associated with women's social rights and this relationship is statistically significant at the .01 level.

Of particular importance, thepredominant religion variable for Islam in Table 2 does not exert a statistically significant influence on women's social rights. Yet, the Islamic law variable does exert a statistically significant negative influence on these rights, lending modest support to arguments that Islam by itself is not a significant obstacle to women's social rights achievement, but countries that elevate Islamic principles in law (i.e. those that fuse religion and state) impede women's ability to enjoy their rights**.**

TABLE2. Women's Rightsonthe Global Sample, Predominant Religion Model (1981-2005)

Independent Variables			
	Political Rights Rights	**Economic Rights Rights**	**Social Rights Rights**
Institutional Secularism	**.140*** **	**.066***	**.100*** **
	(.053)	(.039)	(.028)
CEDAW Commitment	**.128*** **	**.058*** **	**.069*** **
	(.020)	(.016)	(.017)
Democracy	**.043*** **	**.060*** **	**.069*** **

	(.012) .013)	(.023)	(.016)	
Log of GDP Per Capita	**.085*** **	**.349*** **	**.195*** **	.051*** (0.17)
	(.041)	(.044)	(.046)	
International Conflict	.133	-.032	**.253** **	
	(.097)	(.099)	(.104)	
Civil Conflict	-.116	-.055	**-.138*** **	
	(.073)	(.054)	(.053)	
Log of Population	.113	**-.133***	.074	
	(.083)	(.071)	(.079)	
Time	**.071*** **	-.006	**-.014***	
	(.010)	(.008)	(.008)	
Catholicism	-.21	-.21	.22	
	(.20)	(.14)	(.16)	
Islam	**-.73*** **	**-.52*** **	-.181	
	(.23)	(.16)	(.174)	
Buddhism	**-.64*** **	-.25	.356	
	(.25)	(.21)	(.233)	
Hinduism	**-.99*** **	**-.81*** **	**-.45***	
	(.37)	(.28)	(.27) (.271)	
Orthodox	**-.85*** **	**-.49** **	.398	
	(.33)	(.24)	(.248)	
Protestant	.27	.21	**.636*** **	
	(.24)	(.20)	.210	
Women's Rights (t-1)	**4.24*** **	**2.85*** **	**3.56*** **	
	(.151)	(.110))	(.097)	
R 2	.60	.42	.55	
Wald Chi2	1100.19	1236.77	1658.55	
N	3161	3088	2940	

P<*.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01

Table 3 reports the regression results for women's rights and the inverted secularism scale.[11]Recall that we invert the five point institutional secularism scale, which ranges from a low of 0 (i.e., the most secular) to a high of 5 (i.e., the most religious) to capture the effects of institutional religiosity on women's rights.

This table further confirms the hypothesis that the entanglement of religion and state exerts a strongnegative influence on all three types of women's rights at beyond the .01 level of statistical significance.

Table 3: Cross-Sectional Time Series Model Controlling forLevel of Institutional Religiosity

Independent Variables	**PoliticalRights**	**Economic Rights**	**SocialRights**
Institutional Religiosity	**-.132***** (.042)	**-.106***** (.039)	**-.149***** (.039)
Democracy	**.055***** (.016)	**.069***** (.023)	**.083***** (.015)
CEDAW Commitment	**.136***** (.019)	**.057***** (.016)	**.080***** (.017)
Population	.054 (.080)	**-.150**** (.069)	-.055 (.076)
Time	**.068***** (.009)	-.006 (.008)	**-.018**** (.008)
International Conflict	.108 (.099)	-.056 (.098)	**.217**** (.103)
Civil Conflict	-.052 (.073)	-.049 (.053)	**-.124**** (.053)
GDP Per Capita	**.104***** (.041)	**.359***** (.045)	**.209***** (.046)
Women's Rights (t-1)	**4.32***** (.149)	**2.88***** (.109)	**3.59***** (.096)
R2 **WaldChi2** **N**	0.59 1030.42 3160	0.42 1238.30 3091	0.55 1660.50 2950

[11]Only the main independent variables and controls for time, GDP, and population were includedinthismodelsince thegoalistoexamine the relationshipbetweeninstitutional religiosityand women'srights.

TABLE4.Women'sRightsontheGlobalSample, Disaggregated Model (1981 – 2005)

Independent Variables	Model 1 Political Rights	Model 2 Political Rights	Model 1 Economic Rights	Model 2 Economic Righ	Model 1 Social Rights	Model 2 Social Rights
Official State Religion	**-.123***	----	-.24	----	**-.23*****	----
	(.075)		(.060)		(.064)	
Politicization of Religion	**-.92*****	----	**-.63*****	----	**-.39****	----
	(.22)		(.16)		(.18)	
Freedom of Religion	-.023	----	-.099	----	.044	----
	(.083)		(.70)		(.073)	
CEDAWCommitment	**.134*****	**.136*****	**.060*****	**.052*****	**.073*****	**.084*****
	(.021)	(.019) (0.20)	(.16)	(0.20)5	(.017) (0.17)	(.017) (0.
Democracy	**.061*****	**.051*****	**.072*****	**.050*****	**.091*****	**.088*****
	(.015)	(.013)	(.15)	(.017)	(.016)	(.015)
LogofGDP Per Capita	**.043*****	**.126*****	**.382*****	**.451*****	**.232*****	**.212*****
	(.017)	(.039)	(.040)	(.042	(.043)	(.044)
International Conflict	.130	.137	-.024	.032	**.256****	**.26****
	(.125)	(.101)	(.105)	(.096)	(.109)	(.11)
Civil Conflict	-.061	-.052	-.054	-.037	**-.136****	**-.126****
	(.070)	(.073)	(.057)	(.05	(.061)	(.052)
Log of Population	.088	.109	**.124***	-.099	-.077	-.045
	(.095)	(.080)	(.073)	(.06	(.078)	(.076)
Time	**.069*****	**.066*****	.007	-.006	**-.019****	**-.018***
	(.009)	(.009)	(.006)	(.007)	(.008)	(.008)
Women's Rights (t-1)	**4.33*****	**4.27*****	**2.85*****	**2..8 0 ****	**3.59*****	**3.58*****
	(.113)	(.143)	(.110)	(.108)	(.090)	(.097)
R 2	.59	.59	.41	.04 2	.55	.55
WaldChi2	3499.36	1119.58	2486.42	1346.77	3927.63	1661.27
N	3143	3313	3074	324	2925	2965

P<*.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01

Table 4 presents the results of the disaggregated model of the inverted five point secularism scale. We disaggregate the inverted components of this indicator – politicization of religion, official state religion, and freedom of religion - to examine their individual effects and to determine what components are driving the negative relationship to women's rights, which, as previously stated, is important since core theories are lacking on how the various components of religion affect women's rights together or in isolation.

As hypothesized, the dichotomous measure of politicization of religion exerts a statistically significant negative influence on all three categories of women's rights at the .05 to .01 threshold. These results speak to the crucial importance of separation of political party and state to women's rights, and, importantly, they illustrate how conventional separation of church (or Mosque) and state alone is not enough to guarantee women's rights.Importantly, findings for official state religion supports Kettell's (2013) thesis that state religion impinges on political freedoms and, as we hypothesize, by extension, women's rights. Not surprisingly, the indicator of official state religion exerts its most significant negative influence on women's social rights at better than the .01 threshold, and on women's political rights at the .10 threshold. Interestingly, the inverted measure for freedom of religion (i.e. higher scores on this measure indicate greater government restrictions on religious freedom) is not a statistically significant determinant of any of the women's rights variableseven at the .10 statistical threshold. These weak findings make it difficult to generalize about the complex relationship between religious freedom and women's rights especially since so few studies have empirically evaluated this relationship.They clearly warrant further exploration using a blend of more sophisticated methodologies and fine-grained analysis than those used here.

Next, the results in Tables 1 through 4 indicate that democracy is associated with statistically significant increases in government respect for all three categories of women's rights. Significantly, the fact that both the indicators for democracy and institutional secularism in Tables 1 and 2 are significant in the same logit equation shows that each has a strong, independent influence on women's rights achievement. However, though the results produced in these tables illustrate that both democracy and institutional secularism are important determinants of women's rights, they do not show the importance of the intersection of these two variables.We examine their intersection specifically to test our earlier argument that the combination of authoritarianism and fusion of state and religion produces particularly bad outcomes for women.

Table 5 below shows the mean levels of the women's rights variables by the type of political regime and by the level of separation of state and religion.

As expected, an examination of the data reveals that all three types of women's rights are lowest in authoritarian regimes that fuse religion and state, and highest in secular democracies.[12] In particular, I find that the mean levels of women's economic, political, and social rights in fused authoritarian regimes is .78, .77, and an abysmally low .33, respectively, and these results are statistically significant. As expected, religion has its most pernicious influence on women's social rights. Recall that the women's rights scales range from a low of 0 to a high of 3. These results are consistent with studies that find authoritarian religious states, such as Islamic autocracies, are most oppressive of women's rights (Cherif October 2010: 1145; Fish 2002).

Authoritarian religious states, such as Islamic autocracies, are most oppressive of women's rights (Cherif October 2010: 1145; Fish 2002).

[12] In this study, political regimes are classified as authoritarian if they score between 0 to 3 on the *Polity IV Democracy Indicator*; semi-democracy if they score between a 4 and 6 on this measure, and democracy if they score between a 7 to 10 on this measure (Refer to Appendix C). For the sake of clarity and simplicity, the five-point measure of institutional secularization is broken up into a three-fold typology: countries with values of 0 and 1 are classified as cases of state-religion fusion, those with scores of 4 and 5 belong to the category of state-religion separation, and those with scores of 2 to 3 belong to the middle category, which I term partial entanglement of state and religion.

Table 5:[13] **Mean Levels of Women's Rights by Regime Type & by Level of Institutional Secularism**

Separation of State & Religion	**Regime Type**	**Political Rights**	**Economic Rights**	**Social Rights**
State-Religion Fusion (0 –1)	Autocracy	.95	.72	.32
	Semi-democracy	1.76	1.09	.70
	Democracy	1.83	1.34	1.02
Partial State-Religion Entanglement (2-3)	Autocracy	1.60	1.13	.88
	Semi-democracy	1.80	1.24	1.19
	Democracy	1.96	1.65	1.56
State-Religion Separation (4-5)	Autocracy	1.65	1.05	.91
	Semi-democracy	1.86	1.10	1.04
	Democracy	2.17	1.72	1.73

*** = p <.000 ** = p <.00 * = p <.0

The findings for alternative explanations in Tables 1 through 4 reveal that the internationalization of human rights is positively associated with all categories of women's rights at greater than the .01 level of statistical significance with government respect these rights increasing as we ascend up the scale to those countries that express the highest official endorsement of CEDAW (i.e., those that have issued no or few reservations). Conversely, women's rights are the lowest in countries that do not sign or ratify CEDAW.

These results support findings that states adhering to CEDAW are more apt tomodifyor replacediscriminatory religiouslawsandpractices (Yoo September 2012; Gray et al. 2006).

Not surprisingly, we find a country's wealth or level of economic development positively affects a government's ability to provide for women's rights.

[13] Analysis of variance (ANOVA) was used to determine whether the difference in means between the three levels of institutional secularism and between regime types are statistically significant. The results were significant at greater than the .000 level of significance meaning there are discernable and important differences between how institutionally secular and non-secular states treat their female citizens.

The sign is statistically significant at the .01 level in virtually all models, and supports an extensive literature on the human rights effects of development. Next, the results for former colonial experience are mixed. Whereas some forms of colonial rule exert a statistically significant negative influence on all three types of women's rights, other types of colonial rule have negligible effects.[14] Our inconsistent findings give root to many specific questions well-suited to small-N case studies. Time is also an important variable but the results are mixed. The negative coefficient for social rights signifies a decline in these rights over time while the highly positive coefficients for political rights convey asteady improvement over time. These findings are not inconsistent because women are most likely to experience gains in their political rights since these rights are more readily institutionalized in the legal realm through provisions for women's suffrage and political candidacy while women's social rights are more difficult to formalize.

As expected, civil conflict exerts a negative influence at the .01 to .10 significance threshold on women's social rights. However, contrary to theoretical expectations, international conflict is significant between these statistical thresholds but in the opposite direction than hypothesized. Theoretically, both civil and international conflict should have a strong negative influence on all three types of women's rights. Future studies may want to consider exploring these inconsistencies. Finally, population size is associated with statistically significant declines in women's economic rights in all models. These findings infer that a large population may drain the state's ability to redistribute vital economic resources or to target funds to programs designed to reduce gender inequalities.

VII. Conclusion

This study offered an examination of the relationships between religion, the state, and women's economic, social, and political rights in 158 countries from 1981 to 2005. The most important substantive finding is that secular institutional arrangements better advance all three types of women's rights controlling for Islam and predominant religious faith.

[14] The negative results for British colonial influence may be due to gender discriminatory coverture practices British colonizers exported to their colonies. However, it is difficulttogeneralizeabout theeffects ofcolonialismbecausemost colonizedsocieties, particularly in Africa,had in place pre-existing patrilineal and patriarchal institutions.

Resultsdemonstratethat, in comparison to their non-secular counterparts, institutionally secular regimes generally do not make tradeoffs between the different types of rights to appease religious interests, but instead promote the full range of women's rights.Conversely, all types of women's rights are in jeopardy in non-secular states, especially those with an official state religion and those that experience politicization of religion. As expected, the combination of authoritarianism and fusion of state and religion is a double whammy for women with their rights attainment lowest in fused authoritarian regimes. These findings are consequential for more than women's rights and opportunities, as they have broader societal implications. Significant empirical evidence finds that societies that subordinate women are more likely to experience economic stagnation, poverty, high female illiteracy rates, authoritarian governance, political instability, and poor child and maternal health outcomes.[15]

Importantly, the findings of this studypartially refuteexisting quantitative analysesthatblamethe state'spropensity torepresswomen'srightssolelyonIslamic law. Though Islamic law is clearly oppressive of women's social rights,as the findings reveal, any societythatallowsreligionto becometooinvolvedinthemakingofpublicpolicy willtendtoproducepoliciesandpractices that reduce protection sofwomen's rights. Thisholdstrueformost majorworldreligions. However, animportantlimitationof this study and all large Nstudies, for that matter, istheinability to analyze (beyondasuperficiallevel) them any cultural and religious restrictions and practices deemeddetrimental to women'srights, suchasthe tribalpracticesofAfricancountries. The fundamental problem is the great difficulty in separating religion from culture or from custom and tradition, since, in many societies traditional cultural practices are overlaid on religion and supplement religious practices. An example is the practice of dowry death in India, which has it srootsinlocalinterpretations of the Hindureligi on though Hinduismdoesnotc on done suchviolence. Our studydoes notexamine thesetypes of social rights abuses.

Ultimately, the expansion of women's rights as universal rights will require a strong political will by government officials to dismantle systemic discrimination and pervasive gender inequalities that are justified on cultural and religious grounds. Women must also change culturally engrained behaviors in order to take full advantage of their rights. However, this is no easy task.

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[15] See, for example, Fish (October 2002) and Sen (1999) in the References section of our paper.

As Sen (1999) persuasively points out, women may choose to limit themselves from enjoying their full human potential out of fear that they will be harshly punished for stepping outside the bounds of social convention and cultural and religious traditions. Unfortunately, in many societies, cultural and religious forces are often stronger than the laws and policies that seek to advance women's rights. However, as this study reveals, gender egalitarian reform is still possible since religion and culture are not static, monolithic, and impenetrable forces not within certain faith traditions, and clearly not across the broad categories of major religions.[16] As Nobel Peace Laureate Arch Bishop Desmond Tutunotes in reference to customs and religious traditions, societalactors "speakasifthoseare things that are droppedfromheaven, where as they are manmade, and because they are man made they can be changed by us."[17]

Appendix A. SummaryStatistics forAll Variables, 1981 to 2005

Variables	N	Mean	Standard Deviation	Minimum	Maximum
Women's Political Rights	3704	1.754578	.6869789	0	3
Women's Economic Rights	3648	1.280127	.6528316	0	3
Women's Social Rights	3471	1.171997	.8584942	0	3
Political Secularism	3488	3.061353	1.166996	0	4
Democracy	3489	4.365434	4.495445	0	10
CEDAWCommitment	3565	4.190182	3.305314	0	8
Time	3565	12.05386	6.892872	1	24
International Conflict	3515	.088478	.4673407	0	3
Civil Conflict	3481	.3912669	.8920296	0	3
Population Size (logged values)	3540	6.958973	.6646809	5.173763	9.10721
LogofGDP Per Capita	3361	7.456005	1.567291	4.164434	11.21747
BritishInfluence	3565	.312202	.4634567	0	1
SpanishInfluence	3565	.1343619	.3410885	0	1
FrenchInfluence	3565	.168864	.3746843	0	1
PortugueseInfluence	3565	.0269285	.1618971	0	1
OttomanInfluence	3565	.030575	.1721875	0	1
ShariaLaw	3517	.2251919	.4177681	0	1
Copenhagen Conference	3565	.1551192	.3620691	0	1
Nairobi Conference	3565	.1949509	.3962185	0	1
Beijing1995 Conference	3565	.2078541	.4058288	0	1

[16] As our findings illustrate, this assertion may be less true for Islam which appears more impervious than other religions to gender egalitarian reform. However, it is difficult to generalize about the nature of Islam since it is a pluralistic religion with nooneformulationof*Shari'a*law and religious texts, but many versions within and between societies.

[17]*Source:* http://www.halftheskymovement.org/videos/celebrities

Appendix B– the Global Sample Of Countries[18]

Afghanistan	Albania	Algeria	Angola
Argentina	Armenia	Australia	Austria
Azerbaijan	Bahrain	Bangladesh	Belarus
Belgium	Belize	Benin	Bhutan
Bolivia	Bosnia-Herzegovina[18]	Botswana	Brazil
Brunei	Bulgaria	Burkina Faso	Burundi
Cambodia	Canada	Cameroon	Central African Republic
Chad	Chile	China	Colombia
Costa Rica	Cote d'Ivoire	Croatia	Cuba
Cyprus	Czech Republic[19]	Dem. Peoples' Rep. of Korea[20]	Democratic Rep. of Congo [21]
Denmark	Dominican Republic	Ecuador	Egypt
El Salvador	Eritrea	Estonia	Ethiopia
Fiji	Finland	France	Gabon
Gambia	Georgia	Germany	Ghana
Greece	Guatemala	Guinea	Guinea-Bissau
Guyana	Haiti	Honduras	Hungary
Iceland	India	Indonesia	Iran
Iraq	Ireland	Israel	Italy
Jamaica	Japan	Jordan	Kazakhstan
Kenya	Kuwait	Laos	Latvia
Lebanon	Lesotho	Liberia	Libya
Lithuania	Luxembourg	Macedonia	Madagascar
Malawi	Malaysia	Mali	Mauritania
Mauritius	Mexico	Moldova	Mongolia

[18] The 1995 Dayton Accords created the independent state of Bosnia and Herzegovina (www.ussd.gov).
[19] The Czech Republic is formerly known as Czechoslovakia.
[20] The Democratic People's Republic of Korea is also known as North Korea.
[21] The Democratic Republic of Congo is formerly known as Zaire.

Morocco	Mozambique	Myanmar[22]	Namibia
Nepal	Netherlands	New Zealand	Nicaragua
Niger	Nigeria	Norway	Oman
Pakistan	Panama	Papua New Guinea	Paraguay
Peru	Philippines	Poland	Portugal
Qatar	Republic of Korea[23]	Republic of Congo	Romania
Russia	Rwanda	Saudi Arabia	Senegal
Sierra Leone	Singapore	Slovakia	Slovenia
Somalia	South Africa	Spain	Sri Lanka
Sudan	Swaziland	Sweden	Syria
Taiwan	Tajikistan	Tanzania	Thailand
Togo	Trinidad and Tobago	Tunisia	Turkey
Turkmenistan	Uganda	Ukraine	United States
United Arab Emirates	United Kingdom	Uruguay	Uzbekistan
Venezuela	Vietnam	Yemen	Yugoslavia_post[24]
Zambia	Zimbabwe		

Appendixc.Independentandcontrolvariables,1981 – 2005

(VariableName,
Description, Source)

Institutional Secularization: Five-

Point ordinal indicat or the at includes variables for:

[22] Myanmar is also formally known as Burma. [22] The 1995 Dayton Accords created the independent state of Bosnia and Herzegovina (www.ussd.gov).
[22] The Czech Republic is formerly known as Czechoslovakia.
[22] The Democratic People's Republic of Korea is also known as North Korea.
[22] The Democratic Republic of Congo is formerly known as Zaire.
[22] Myanmar is also formally known as Burma.
[23] The Republic of Korea is also known as South Korea.
[24] Yugoslavia_post is now called Serbia and Montenegro, which is a constitutional republic consisting of the relatively large Republic of Serbia and the much smaller Republic of Montenegro (http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2004/41706.htm).

Official state religion, (2) freedom of religion, and (3) the politicization ofreligious interests. Source: Fox and Sandler Religion and State Dataset, CIA World Factbook, and theU.S.State Department's Annual Report on Religious Freedom.

Democracy: Anindicat or measuring the level of democracy along an additive continuum that ranges fromal owscore of 0 (nodemocracy) to a high score of 10 (democracy). *Source: Polity IV indicator* by Marshall and Jaggers. [Online]. Available: http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/polity/.Under this measure, other aspects of democracy, such as freedom of assembly and association, freedom of speech and press, and rule of law are treated as the outcomes of a competitive democratic state. The competitiveness of political participation and the openness of executive recruitment, for example, rely to a large extent upon the freedom of thought and speech and the freedom to organize in political associations or parties. Importantly, this indicator measures the extent of democratic-ness enjoyed by a nation and its people, not merely formal rights guaranteed on paper.

Internationalization Of human rights norms: (1)an8-point weight edratification variable of the level of official end or sement of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW). The variable has four categories code das follows: (4) acountry makes no reservations to the CEDAW or any interpretative declarations that modify treatyobligations; (3) a country makes reservations that could have some but not major impactson their obligations. This includesr eservation stocertainarticles of CEDAW butnotnullifying itcompletely;(2)a country makes reservations that have a notice able effect on it so bligations under the convention to a whole article, null ifyingor leaving open the possibility nottoabide by a whole article; and (1) acountry makes reservations that have significant and severe effects on the convention's obligations. Reservations that subject the whole convention to national or religiouslegislation would receivethis score. Aratifying country's reservationscoreis then multiplied by two, which is the original ratificationscorethatallconventionsignatoriesreceive. Countriesthatdonotratify the convention receive a score of 0. Those that sign the convention but do notratify it receiveascore of 1. *Source:* Todd Landman (2005); Economic development: Logged values of percapitagross domestic product (GDP). *Source:*World Bank,*World Development Indicators*.

Islamiclaw: Dichotomous variable coded "1" if Sharialaw is part of a country'slegal system. Source: CIAWorld Factbook.

Predominant Religion:_Dichotomous variable coded "1" if a country is predominantly one of the following religions: Islam, Catholicism, Buddhism, Hinduism, Orthodox, and Protestantism. Country classifications for this variable are drawn primarily from *The CIA World Factbook.*

Institutional religiosity: The inverted institutional secularismscale: alow of "1" Represent scountries that are them ostsecular and a high of "5" represents countries that are the least secular (i.e. the most religious). Civil orinternational conflict:_Athree-point ordinal scale capturing these verity of civil/international conflict measured interms of the number of battledeathsinagiven country for a particular year. Itiscodedas:0 =Nowar; 1=Minorconflict, where there have been atleast 25 battledeathsperyear; and2=Majorconflict, where there have been more than 1000 battle related deaths per year. *Source:* Harvard Strand, Lars Wilhelmsen & NilsPetter Gleditsch, *International Peace Research Institute, Armed Conflict Dataset Codebook* (2013), availableat http://www.prio.no/cwp/armedconflict/current/codebook_v2_1.pdf.

Conflicts were coded as "internal" if they met the following conditions: 1) the conflict occurred between the government of a particular state and one or more internal opposition group(s) without intervention from other states; and 2) the conflict took on an internationalized character but it was still coded as "internal" if the conflict occurred between the government of a state and one or more internal opposition group(s) with intervention from other states on one or both sides (e.g.,, Iraqi conflict and Coalition Forces). Conflicts were coded as "interstate" if the conflict occurred between two or more states.

Populationsize: The loggedmidyear country population of eachnation state. *Source*: U.S. Government Census International Data Base.

Time:Measuredasacountvariable, given as core ofo ne in 1981 and continuing in increments of one foreach subsequent year.

Formercolonial experience:Adichotomousvariabletoindicate whe ther a country Had experience dacolonial relationship with the following colonial powers: French,Spanish, British, Portuguese, Ottoman, and Soviet.

The variable for Sovietistreatedasthebaseline category since communism is historically associated with better treatment of women. Measured 1 if acountry had such a relationship and 0 other wise (Hensel 1999). In cases where a country had been colonized by more than one world power, it wascodedasa'1' for the power in control at the time of independence. *Source:* Paul Hensel's International Correlates of War (ICOW) Colonial History Data Set. [Online] Available: http://www.paulhensel.org/dataintl.html#socsci

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